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Comment
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY vs. THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
RECONCILING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN A
PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF FREE SPEECH
I.

INTRODUcTION

In recent years, courts and commentators have increasingly
recognized the pecuniary value of the names and likenesses of
famous persons and celebrities.' In order to shield this pecuniary
value from harm, "the right of publicity" has emerged and developed as a guard against and remedy for the unauthorized commercial exploitation of another's name and likeness. 2 The right
1. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
("[i]t is clear to this court that [Muhammad Ali] has established a valuable
interest in his name and his likeness"); Donenfeld, Property or Other Rights
in the Names, Likenesses or Personalitiesof Deceased Persons, 16 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17, 19 (1968) ("in recent years the values of certain famous names
have become inestimable"); Feinberg, Madison Avenue's Cast of Famous Faces,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, § 3, at 7, col. 1 (noting dramatic increase in value
and use of celebrities' names and likenesses in commercial endorsements).
To illustrate the enormous pecuniary value of the names and likenesses
of famous persons, consider the following example. After the assassination of
ex-Beatle John Lennon in December of 1980, the use of his name and likeness
in the cover stories of many magazines and newspapers dramatically boosted
sales and profits: New York, 60,000 newsstand copies, its all time bestselling
issue; People, 2.6 million newsstand copies, a record for newsstand sales; Time,
500,000 newsstand copies, the third bestselling issue in ten years; The Chicago
Sun-Times, 740,000 copies of its Lennon supplement sold out. TIME, January
12, 1981, at 57.
2. See generally Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality
and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553, 569-71 (1960); Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123 (1953). In support of the
publicity doctrine, Professor Nimmer has argued:
It would seem to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence,
an axiom of the most fundamental nature, that every person is entitled
to the fruit of his labors . . . . [P]ersons who have long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity values may be deprived of
them, unless judicial recognition is given to what is here referred to
as the right of publicity.
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW 8CCONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 216 (1954).
For a review of the origins and development of the publicity doctrine, see
notes 19-98 and accompanying text infra.
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of publicity is a term of art which refers to an individual's right
to own, protect, and profit from his or her name and likeness.3
This right first received judicial endorsement as an independent legal concept in 1953 when the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decided Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.4 Since Haelan, the right of publicity has
won increasing acceptance by courts as a common law right,5 and
3. See Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of
Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 677 (1981). For
the leading article on the right of publicity, see Nimmer, supra note 2. For
various discussions of the right of publicity, see Horowitz, An Analysis of the
Right of Publicity, 6 ART. 8c L. 39 (1981); Pipel, The Right of Publicity, 27
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 249 (1980); Rader, The "Right of Publicity"-A New
Dimension, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 228 (1979); Sobel, Count Dracula and the
Right of Publicity, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 373 (1972); Note, The Right of PublicityProtection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527 (1976);
Comment, Privacy, Appropriation, and the First Amendment: A Human
Cannonball's Rather Rough Landing, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Privacy, Appropriation]; Comment, Invasion of Privacy-Recovery
For Nonconsentual Use of Photographs in Motion Pictures Based on the
Appropriation of Property, 11 DUQ. L. REV. 358, 363-64 (1973); Comment, The
Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Memphis Dev. Found. v.Factors Etc.,
Inc., 14 GA. L. REV. 831 (1980); Comment, A Haystack in a Hurricane:
Divergent Case Law on the Right of Publicity and the Copyright Act of 1976,
63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 296 (1981); Comment, The Right of Publicity in California: An Overview, 1 Loy. L.A. ENTER. J. 165 (1981); Comment, The Right
of Publicity: Premature Burial for California Property Rights in the Wake of
Lugosi, 12 PAC. L.J. 987 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Premature Burial]; Comment, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity upon the Death of the Famous,
33 VAND. L. REV. 1251 (1980).
4. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). It was in
Haelan that the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Jerome Frank, first
coined the term "right of publicity." Id. at 868. In Haelan, the plaintiffcorporation obtained, by way of contract, the exclusive rights to use a baseball
player's name and likeness in promoting sales of chewing gum. Id. at 867.
When the defendant-competitor attempted to use the same player's name and
likeness in advancing its own sales of gum, the plaintiff sued, and the court
protected the plaintiff's ownership of a right of publicity. Id. at 867-69. For
a further discussion of Haelan, see notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
5. Shipley, supra note 3, at 675 9- n.12. By the 1980's, the right of publicity had been explicitly recognized, in one form or another, in nearly all of
the major jurisdictions by both federal and state courts. See, e.g., Fleer Corp.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania);
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (Tennessee); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (New York);
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-26 (9th Cir.
1974) (California); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969)
(Missouri); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp.
485, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (New York); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981) (New Jersey); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center
for Social Change, Inc. v. Amercian Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854,
862 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Georgia); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,
1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (Minnesota); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813,
824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979) (en banc) (dictum)
(California); Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223-24 (Me. 1977)
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has also gained recognition by legislatures as a statutory right.6
In 1977, it received approval by the United States Supreme Court
in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 7 Despite the
wide adoption of the publicity doctrine, its definition, in the
words of one commentator, "remains unclear; its theory is still
evolving and its limits are uncertain." 8
(dictum) (Maine); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.
2d 224, 231-32, 351 N.E.2d 454, 459-60 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433
U.S. 562 (1977) (dictum) (Ohio); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis.
2d 379, 391, 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1979) (Wisconsin); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114
Ga. App. 367, 377-78, 151 S.E.2d 496, 503-04 (Ct. App. 1966) (dictum) (Georgia);
Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 352, 235 A.2d 62, 76 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1967) (New Jersey). But see: Carson v. National Bank of Commerce
Trust & Say., 356 F. Supp. 811 (D. Neb. 1973), afJ'd, 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir.
1974) (no common law right of publicity in Nebraska).
6. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§839.2 (West Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-406 (1978); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-40 (1977). A number of states provide statutory protection for publicity interests under the rubric of the right of privacy or the tort of misappropriation. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1980); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-202, 20-207,
20-208 (Cum. Supp. 1980); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 &
Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 47-2-7 (1980). For a discussion of the California
statute protecting the right of publicity, see Comment, Commercial Appropriation of an Individual's Name, Photograph or Likeness: A New Remedy
for Californians, 3 PAC. L.J. 651 (1972).
7. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini, the Court held that the plaintiffentertainer's human cannonball act was property within the meaning of state
common law recognizing a right of publicity, and that a local television station
could not assert a first amendment privilege to broadcast the plaintiff's act in
its entirety. Id. at 575-79. For a fuller discussion of Zacchini, see notes 87-98
8&165-78 and accompanying text infra.
8. Shipley, supra note 3, at 675 (footnote omitted). The uncertainties
surrounding the right of publicity involve at least seven, often interconnecting,
problem areas:
I) The doctrinal basis of the right of publicity-is the right of publicity
based on a property interest, a property-like or proprietary interest, or a
privacy interest drawn from the right of privacy? If the right of publicity is
privacy based, it remains personal to the owner, and cannot be devised or
descend to one's heirs. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813,
603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (en banc) (holding right of publicity
part of right of privacy, and therefore non-descendible). If the right of publicity is property-based, it is both devisable and descendible. See Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979) (holding right of publicity validly transferable and perpetual).
2) The survivability of the right of publicity after the death of its original
owner-to what extent and in what manner can a non-privacy based right of
publicity survive the death of its original owner? For a review of this problem, see generally Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49
FOEDHAM L. REV. 453 (1981).
3) The transferability of the right of publicity-to what extent and in
what manner can a non-privacy based right of publicity be devised or descend?
For a discussion of this problem, see generally Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89
YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the
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A core conceptual problem underlying the right of publicity
is the appropriate method by which it should be reconciled with
the first amendment's guarantee of free speech. Recent right of
Right of Publicity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (1978); Comment, Transfer of the
Right of Publicity: Dracula'sProgeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1103 (1975).
4) The scope of the right of publicity-does the publicity doctrine extend
so as to protect not only a plaintiff's name or likeness, but also items such as
his performances, mannerisms, voice, gestures, expressions, and dress? For a
discussion of this problem, see Comment, The Right of Publicity as a Means
of Protecting Performers' Style, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 129 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Performers' Style].
5) The appropriate analogies to be drawn between the right of publicity
and other areas of law-to what extent can or should the law of publicity be
accurately analogized to areas such as: a) defamation law (see Lahr v. Adell
Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962) (suggesting plaintiff's interest may
be protectable under defamation)); b) misappropriation law (see Shipley, supra
note 3, at 684-86) (misappropriation doctrine analogous to right of publicity));
c) unfair competition law (see Donovan v. Wilson Sporting Goods, Co., 285
F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1961) (right of publicity has elements of unfair competition));
d) privacy law (see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971)
(classifying publicity as a category of action under the rubric of right of
privacy)); and e) copyright law (see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977) (analogizing publicity law to copyright law)).
If it is proper to analogize the right of publicity to copyright law, a question
arises as to whether, and to what extent, publicity actions have been preempted
by the federal copyright statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-353, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 9: Supp. 1981)). For an
excellent discussion of this problem, see generally Shipley, supra note 3.
6) Practical problems in assessing the value and duration of the right of
publicity-how should the right of publicity be valued and timed for purposes
such as taxation or transfer? For one court's bewilderment over this issue,
see Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) ("How long would the property interest
last? In perpetuity? For a term of years? Is the right of publicity taxable?").
7) The constitutional limitations on the right of publicity-to what extent
does the first amendment's guarantee of free speech limit an action for infringement of an individual's right of publicity? For a discussion of this
problem, see notes 99-178 and accompanying text infra.
9. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.).
For various discussions of the free speech guarantee, see Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 709-847 (1978).
The first amendment is applicable to the states by way of the fourteenth
amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. The first and fourteenth amendments not only prohibit the
states from enacting statutes which restrain free speech, but also prohibit the
states from adopting rules of tort law-such as the right of publicity-which
would restrain free speech. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277
(1964).
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publicity cases typically project a plaintiff who asserts publicity
interests in preventing the misappropriation of his name or likeness, against a defendant who asserts first amendment interests in
making use of the plaintiff's name or likeness. 10 For example, in
Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine," the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of New York was confronted
with a plaintiff-movie actress who brought a right of publicity
action against a defendant-publisher who had printed a partially
nude photograph of the plaintiff, doing so under a claim of first
amendment privilege. 12 Although cases pitting the right of publicity against the first amendment have been steadily increasing, 13
the law of publicity has, according to one pair of commentators,
largely failed to adopt any principled analytical framework under
which first amendment and publicity interests can be accommo4
dated.'
15
This comment will trace the origins of the right of publicity,
examine its development in the case law,'0 consider the first amendment defense to a right of publicity action,' 7 and propose a caseby-case analysis to be used in future actions where the first amendment conflicts with the right of publicity.' 8
10. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, Inc., 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (heirs of Agatha Christie assert a right of publicity in her
name and likeness against a publisher of a book and movie called "Agatha"
who asserts that the product is protected as entertainment under the first
amendment); Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d
949 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1972) (record company with exclusive contract with
Elvis Presley asserts a right of publicity in his name and likeness against a producer of a "talking magazine" reproducing a Presley press conference who
asserts that his product is protected as newsworthy under the first amendment).
11. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
12. Id. at 405 &-n.8. In Ann-Margret, the plaintiff failed to restrain the
defendant's publication of her photograph because the court held that there
was "newsworthiness" in a famous movie actress appearing partially nude.
Id. at 405.
13. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp.
485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting "burgeoning activity" in right of publicity
area).
14. Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People
by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1578-79, 1592 (1979). See also Kulzick &Hogue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 14 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 57, 58 (1980) (first amendment values underlying publicity doctrine largely
ignored).
15. See notes 19-35 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 53-98 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 99-178 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 187-208 and accompanying text infra.
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THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY.

A. The Conceptual Roots of the Right of Publicity:
The Right of Privacy
The right of publicity is conceptually and historically rooted
in the "right of privacy." "I The concept of a right of privacy
was first proposed in a seminal law review article written in 1890
by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. 20
Warren and
Brandeis defined the right of privacy as the "right to be let
alone," 21 and argued for the existence of such a right in the common law.2 2 Just a few years later, in 1904, the privacy right won
its first judicial recognition in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. 23 In Pavesich, a corporation used the plaintiff's name
19. See generally Performers' Style, supra note 8, at 130; Note, Performer's
Right of Publicity: A Limitation on News Privilege, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 587,
595 (1977); Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 8, at 751. For general discussions of the privacy right, see
W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117 at 802-18; Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475
(1968); Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); 62 AM. JuR.
2D Privacy §§ 1-49 (1972 & Supp. 1981); 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy §§ 1-8 (1952
& Supp. 1981).
20. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
This piece has been viewed as "perhaps the most influential of all law review
articles." Privacy, Appropriation, supra note 3, at 581 (footnote omitted).
See also Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 328 (1966); Nimmer, supra note 3, at 203; Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960). For a full discussion of this article's
seminal role, see M. SLOUGH, PRIVAcY, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 27-42
(1969).
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 195, citing T. COOLEY, LAW OF
TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). Almost forty years after writing the article, Justice
Brandeis called the right to be let alone "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 193-214. In
arguing that the common law supported a right of privacy, the authors began
with the principle, "as old as the common law," that the individual should
have full protection in person and in property-a "right to life." Id. at 193.
Legal protection for the "right to life" was manifested in such emerging areas
of law as assault, battery, nuisance, slander and libel. Id. at 193-94. The
authors then reviewed a number of English decisions and found in them a
trend expanding the scope of legal protection for an individual's right to
enjoy life, and a movement to recognize a "general right of the individual to
be let alone." Id. at 205.
23. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1904). The first case in which a right of
privacy was actually asserted was Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). In Roberson, the plaintiff sued a defendantadvertiser for the unauthorized use of her name and likeness as part of an
advertisement for flour, claiming a right of privacy. Id. at 542-43, 64 N.E. at
442. The New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize the asserted right.
Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447. Judge Gray submitted a persuasive dissenting
opinion arguing for both recognition of a privacy right, and protection against
unauthorized use of a person's name or likeness. Id. at 557-67, 64 N.E. at
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and likeness, without his consent, in an advertisement for life
insurance.24 The plaintiff sued the corporation alleging an invasion of his right of privacy. 25 The Supreme Court of Georgia
held that, within constitutional limits of free speech and press, 26
one has a right to be free of unwanted publicity, and that unauthorized use of one's likeness in an advertisement violates that
right.2 7

Since Pavesich, the vast majority of jurisdictions have

recognized and protected a right of privacy. 28
448-51 (Gray, J., dissenting). Following the Roberson decision, the New York
Legislature responded by enacting a right to privacy statute. See 1909 N.Y.
Laws ch. 14, §§ 1-2 (1909) (presently codified at N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1976 &cSupp. 1981)).
24. 122 Ga. at 192-93, 50 S.E. at 68-69.
25. Id. at 193, 50 S.E. at 69.
the sum of $25,000. Id.

The plaintiff asked for money damages in

26. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and press. For the text of the first amendment, see note 9
supra. For a discussion of the first amendment problem in the right of publicity area, see notes 99-178 and accompanying text infra.
The Pavesich court did not undertake an extended analysis of the first
amendment limits to privacy law but only briefly noted, almost in passing,
that the freedom to speak, write, and print within the legitimate bounds of
the constitutional guarantees of those rights, limits the right of privacy. 122
Ga. at 204-05, 50 S.E. at 74. The court did assert that any abuse of first
amendment liberties such as libel or slander did not restrain the exercise of
the right to privacy. Id. Under the facts in Pavesich, the court ruled that a
publication of a person's picture, without his consent, as part of an advertisement for the publisher's business which falsely implied that the person purchased and endorsed the publisher's product, was libelous, and did not invoke
first amendment free speech or press. Id. at 219, 50 S.E. at 80.
27. 122 Ga. at 220, 50 S.E. at 80-81. The Pavesich court was "Islo
thoroughly satisfied" with its holding that it "venture[d] to predict that the
day will come when the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was
ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability; just as in the present day
we stand amazed that . . . Lord Hale, with perfect composure of manner and

complete satisfaction of soul, imposed the death penalty for witchcraft upon
ignorant and harmless women." Id.
28. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117, at 802-04. For a
sampling of states and cases recognizing the right of privacy, see Prosser, supra
note 20, at 386-88 (1960). The right of privacy has been recognized by the
Supreme Court, in various contexts, as having a constitutional basis within the
penumbra of specific constitutional rights. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 93
(1973) (Blackmun, J.) (privacy interests protected under fourteenth amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Douglas, J.) (privacy
interests protected under first, fourth and fifth amendments); id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (privacy interests protected under ninth amendment);
id. at 502 (White, J., concurring) (privacy interests protected under fourteenth
amendment); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(privacy interests protected under fourteenth amendment). For a discussion
of the privacy right's constitutional sources, see Clark, Constitutional Sources
of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L, REV. 833 (1974).
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The right of privacy is viewed as consisting of four different
tort categories: 29 1) "intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion;" 80 2) public disclosure of embarrassing private
facts about the plaintiff; 81 3) "publicity which places the plaintiff
in a false light in the public eye;" 82 and 4) "appropriation, for
the defendant's benefit or advantages, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness." 13 It is this fourth category of the privacy right which
spawned the modern concept of a right of publicity,
its lineal ancestor. 3

4

and remains

The appropriation category of the right of privacy and the
right of publicity seek to protect the same interest-the right of a
person to be free from unauthorized use of his name or likenessbut from different points of reference.80 The publicity right emphasizes the proprietary nature and value of the plaintiff's name
and likeness,3 7 and guards against damage to this property.8 8 The
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117, at 802-18; Prosser, Privacy, supra
note 20, at 389.
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117, at 807. Accord, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117, at 809-12.
Accord, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D (1977).

32. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, §117, at 812. Accord, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
33. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117, at 804. Accord, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
34. See generally Sims, supra note 8, at 464.
35. Some modern courts continue to cast the right of publicity in privacy
terms. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d
813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (en banc). For a discussion of
Memphis Development, see notes 68-73 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Lugosi, see notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of publicity protection under a privacy rubric, see Comment, Advertising and the Right of Privacy, 9 VILL. L. REV. 274 (1964); Annot., 23
A.L.R.3d 865 (1969).

Further, some recent commentators have argued that publicity interests
may well be best protected under the umbrella of a "relational theory of
privacy." See Comment, The Relational Right of Privacy Theory-Recovery
on the Basis of Conduct Directed at a Deceased or Living Relative, Friend or
Associate, 21 RUTcERS L. REV. 74 (1966); Comment, Why Not A Relational
Right of Privacy-or Right of Property?, 42 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 175
(1973). A relational right of privacy is a concept which refers to the interest
in preserving the relationship between relatives or closely associated nonrelatives "free from degradation, defamation or commercial exploitation."
at 175.

Id.

36. For a discussion of the differences between privacy and publicity rights,
see Performers' Style, supra note 8, at 135-38.
37. Id. at 138.
38. See generally id. at 137.
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privacy appropriation tort, on the other hand, is based on an injury to the plaintiff's feelings and emotional well-being when his
name or likeness is misappropriated, 39 and permits money damages
40
to compensate for such injury.
In deciding cases involving the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's name or likeness, some courts have not properly distinguished
between the privacy appropriation tort and the right of publicity
tort, resulting in a failure to adequately protect the pecuniary
value of names and likenesses. 41 For example, in O'Brien v. Pabst
Sales Co.,42 the photograph of a well-known collegiate football
43

player was used, without permission, in beer advertisements.
The Fifth Circuit refused to grant any relief for the plaintiff,
and held, under a privacy theory, that the football player, by be44
coming a famous personality, had "waived" his right to privacy.
In a prophetic dissent, Judge Edwin R. Holmes criticized the court
for deciding the case under a privacy banner, and argued that what
was actually in issue was a property right to use, or preclude from
45
using, one's name or likeness in an advertisement.
Beyond the failure to recognize and guard the extra-personal
property value in one's name or likeness as in O'Brien, a privacybased rationale for the right of publicity presents additional difficulties-both conceptual and practical. 46 First, privacy interests,
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting judicial confusion in privacy and publicity law);
Shipley, supra note 3, at 677 n.23 (noting judicial obfuscation of distinctive
nature of privacy and property interests). For a well-documented discussion

of the general confusion in this area, see Gordon, supra note 2.
42. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1941).
43. Id. at 168.
44. Id. at 168-69.

45. Id. at 170-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The O'Brien opinion is often
cited by commentators as an example of a case where the plaintiff inappropriately alleged an injury to feelings under a privacy theory, when the actual
harm was an injury to a pecuniary interest, and where an assertion of an
alternative theory, e.g., a property right of publicity action, might have resulted in a recovery. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 564; Comment, Invasion of

Privacy-Recovery for Nonconsentual Use of Photographs in Motion Pictures

Based on the Appropriation of Property, supra note 3, at 359. For another
early case illustrating the same problem, see Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304
N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).

46. For a discussion of the inadequacies of privacy-based protection for
publicity interests, see Nimmer, supra note 2, at 204-10; Performers' Style,

supra note 8, at 155-56.
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being personal to an individual, are neither devisable 47 nor descendible. 48 However, publicity values in famous persons' names and
49
likenesses can well be viewed as both devisable and descendible,
and therefore cannot even be recognized under traditional privacy
law. Further, in most cases, the harm sought to be remedied when
a person's name or likeness is misappropriated is not an injury to
feelings, as in privacy law, but, rather, the loss of potential financial
gain, a property value outside the scope of privacy law. 50 Lastly,
privacy interests only pertain to human beings, and are therefore
limited in application, while publicity values may well develop
52
and apply to entities such as corporations "' or even animals.
B. The Recognition of a ProprietaryBased Right of Publicity
As the inadequacies of privacy-based protection for names and
likenesses became evident, 53 courts began to gradually develop a
property-based notion of publicity. 54 Support for such a proprie47. See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935); W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117,
at 815.
48. See, e.g., Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 423 F.2d 265, 266
(6th Cir. 1970); W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 117, at 815. Contra, Smith v. Doss,
251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So. 2d 118, 121 (1948).
49. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). See also Hicks v. Casablanca Records &
Filmworks, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
50. One court has explained this by stating:
[W]here plaintiff is a person who may be termed a "public figure,"
such as an actor or an athlete . . . [h]e does not complain that, by
reason of the publication of his picture in connection with the
advertisement of a product, his name and face have become a matter
of public comment, but rather that the commercial value which has
attached to his name because of the fact that he is a public figure has
been exploited without his having shared in the profits therefrom.
Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 316 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
Phila. Cty. 1957) (emphasis added).
51. For instance, Delaware appears to recognize a property right in a
corporation's name. See Standard Oil Shares v. Standard Oil Group, 17 Del.
Ch. 113, 125, 150 A. 174, 180 (1930), relying on American Steel Foundries v.
Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
52. Professor Nimmer has observed that "[i]t is common knowledge that
animals often develop important publicity values. Thus, it is obvious that the
use of the name and portrait of the motion picture dog Lassie in connection
with dog food would constitute a valuable asset." Nimmer, supra note 2,
at 210.
53. For a review of some of these inadequacies, see notes 46-52 and
accompanying text supra.
54. See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER
453 (1975) (noting that the inadequacies of the right of privacy necessitated
judicial recognition of the right of publicity); Gordon, supra note 2, at 554-55
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tary right of publicity can be drawn even from early English cases
according protection for aspects of an individual's persona. 55 For
example, in Pollard v. Photographic Co.,5 6 the English Chancery

Division, in 1888, recognized that one had a property right in his
photographic likeness, and issued an injunction restraining a
photographer from selling or exhibiting extra copies of the plaintiff's picture without consent.5 7 By 1891, the United States Supreme Court had also suggested the existence of a proprietary
publicity interest by observing that "[a] man's name is his own
property, and he has the same right to its use and enjoyment as
he has to that of any other species of property." 58
A full-fledged proprietary right of publicity was first recognized by the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.59 In Haelan, the plaintiff-corporation
(noting that the doctrine of privacy is increasingly inapplicable to publicity
situations). Expansive notions of the scope of property interests enabled
courts to easily inject property aspects into publicity law. See Yuba River
Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 523, 279 P. 128, 129 (1929)
(property includes "every species of estate, real and personal, and everything
which one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every
species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is
practicable to place a money value."). Accord, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095
(5th ed. 1979). For examples of early cases gravitating toward property
notions of publicity, see Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076
(Ct. App. 1911); Edison v. Edison Polyform and Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67
A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
55. See, e.g., Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 Hall & Tw. 28, 47 Eng. Rep.
1313 (Ch. 1849) (injunction issued against publication of surgeon's lectures on
grounds of a property right in ideas of the lectures); Prince Albert v. Strange,
1 Mach. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch. 1849) (injunction issued against
exhibition of drawings and etchings on grounds of a property right in artistic
creations); Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden 329, 28 Eng. Rep. 924
(Ch. 1758) (injunction issued against release of original manuscript on grounds
of a property right in its contents).
56. 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888).
57. Id. at 352-54.
58. Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544 (1891) (dictum). Professor Nimmer has also viewed publicity interests in property terms. See
Nimmer, supra note 2, at 204, 215-16. The Second Restatement similarly regards the publicity right as analogous to a property right. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §652C, comment a (1977).
But see Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 196, 50 S.E. 68, 70 (1904) (right of publicity spoken of as a correlative of the right of privacy). For a discussion of
Pavesich, see notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
59. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). A number of
pre-Haelan opinions had indicated either a desirability or willingness to extend
protection to publicity values. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader
Press, 106 F.2d 229, 231 (10th Cir. 1939) (recognizing indispensable value of
publicity and advertising to stars); Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188,
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contracted for the exclusive right to use a baseball player's name

and likeness on chewing gum cards.6 0 When a competitor secured
consent to use the same player's name and likeness on competing
chewing gum cards, the plaintiff sued for a tortious invasion of
contract rights."' The Second Circuit granted relief for the plaintiff, and in the process stated:
We think that, in addition to and independent of [the]
right of privacy .

. . ,

a man has a right in the publicity

value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a
grant may validly be made "in gross" . .. .
This right might be called a "right of publicity."
For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons . . . would feel sorely deprived if they no longer

received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could
barred
be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
62
any other advertiser from using their pictures.
194-95, 89 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1949) (recognizing protectible interest in plaintiff's
right to reproduce a "first-portrait" of Harry S Truman); Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952) (Desmond, J., concurring)
(recognizing inadequacy of protecting publicity under privacy theory); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 557, 64 N.E. 442, 448 (1902)
(Gray, J., dissenting) (arguing for protection against unauthorized commercial
use of a person's likeness); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures
Co., 255 A.D. 459, 464, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850-51 (App. Div. 1938) (recognizing
publicity values as property right); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton,
238 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (recognizing property interest in
one's signature). But see Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d
763, 766 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935) (court unwilling to allow
property protection for baseball players' names and likenesses). Pre-Haelan
courts had also recognized legal interests similar to the right of publicity, such
as an interest in the commercial value of personality. See, e.g., Uproar Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934); Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
60. 202 F.2d at 867.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 868. The Haelan court's holding that the right of publicity is
an extra-personal item of commercial value capable of assignment necessarily
implies that it viewed publicity as a property right. Performers' Style, supra
note 8, at 135 n.36. Cf. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314,
315-16 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. Cty. 1957) (discussing differences between rights of
privacy and publicity, and suggesting the latter has pecuniary value).
Although the Haelan court treated the right of publicity as a property
right, it went on to say that whether the publicity right "be labelled a 'property' right is immaterial" because "the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the
fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth." 202 F.2d at 868.
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A number of federal courts have followed the lead of the
Haelan court and recognized a property-based publicity interest.65
63. For circuit courts adopting a property-based publicity interest, see
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974);
Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956). For district courts adopting a
property-based publicity interest, see Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Sharman v. C.
Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
It should be noted that courts which adopt a right of publicity theory
must initially grapple with several threshold issues before granting relief. One
issue is the degree of similarity between the infringing representation and the
instant plaintiff's actual name or likeness. If the defendant's infringing name
or likeness is not sufficiently similar to the plaintiff's actual name or likeness,
there may be no appropriate action for relief. See, e.g., Levy v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (plaintiff not sufficiently portrayed or
pictured in defendant's motion picture to warrant relief); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978) (mem.
decision) (no actual use of plaintiff's name, portrait or picture in defendant's
book and movie so as to warrant relief); University of Notre Dame Du Lac v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App.
Div.), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965) (plaintiff
not sufficiently portrayed or identified in defendant's motion picture to warrant
relief); Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 1946)
(plaintiff not sufficiently portrayed or identified in defendant's play to warrant
relief). See also Felcher Re Rubin, supra note 14, at 1609 (noting that case
law requires that plaintiff be clearly identified and extensively portrayed before
cause of action arises). The sufficient similarity requirement in publicity law
may well be akin to the likelihood of confusion requirement in a trademark
or tradename infringement action. For a review of the likelihood of confusion
requirement in trademark and tradename law, see MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION ch. 23 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 171(l)(a);
§ 728 & comments a-c; § 729 & comments a-e (1938).
A second issue involves the incidental use rule. Even if the plaintiff's
name or likeness is actually appropriated, mere incidental use of the plaintiff's
publicity is considered de minimus, and is not sufficient to warrant recovery.
See, e.g., Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 400 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1980) (mere
incidental use of plaintiff's picture in connection with a sociological commentary not actionable); Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977)
(mere incidental use of plaintiff's picture without commercial objectives not
actionable); Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737
(App. Div. 1962) (mere incidental use of plaintiff's picture exists where it is
simply republished from a proper earlier photograph). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment d (1977) (incidental use of plaintiff's name
and likeness does not state a cause of action).
A third issue is the identifiable harm requirement. Even if the plaintiff's
name or likeness is actually appropriated in a non-incidental way, the plaintiff cannot recover unless he can show an identifiable commercial harm to his
publicity interests or a tangible commercial benefit to the defendant. In
connection with the identifiable harm requirement in publicity law, see
Hansen v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2398 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty.), rev'd, 429 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1980). A fourth issue is the
proximate cause inquiry. Courts require a showing that the defendant's
activity proximately caused the harm to the plaintiff or the benefit to the
defendant before relief can be granted. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire &Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971) (no
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Some of these courts have expanded on the concept of a propertybased publicity right. For example, in Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 4 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
recognized a property right of publicity which survived the death
of the original owner of the right. Price involved a dispute over
the ownership rights to use the names and likenesses of two famous deceased comedians-Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy.6 5
The plaintiffs in the action were the widows of Laurel and Hardy.
They claimed ownership rights as heirs, and sued the defendantfilm corporation, which claimed ownership rights under employment contracts with Laurel and Hardy. 66 In response to the
defendant's contention that publicity rights, like privacy interests,
could not survive the death of an individual, the court set forth
the following rationale for upholding a survivable property claim
of publicity:
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy ... is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a logical
conclusion to any such claim . . . . When determining

the scope of the right of publicity, however, one must
take into account the purely commercial nature of the
protected right .

.

.

.

There appears to be no logical

reason to terminate this right upon death of the person
protected. It is for this reason, presumably, that this publicity right has been deemed a "property right." 67
While some courts chose to expand the right of publicity,
others have elected to limit the reach of the concept. For example,
in Memphis Development Foundation.v. Factors Etc., Inc., 68 the

Sixth Circuit removed survivability from the scope of the publicity doctrine. Memphis Development involved the validity of
the ownership of Elvis Presley's right of publicity. 69 An assignee,
cause of action stated because imitation of plaintiff's singing style caused no
harm to plaintiff); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal.
1969) (no cause of action stated because imitation of plaintiff's singing style
caused no harm to plaintiff). See also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1615.

64. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
65. Id. at 837.
66. Id. at 838. The plaintiffs also sued several other defendants alleging
misappropriation of property rights in Laurel and Hardy's names and likenesses. Id. at 839.
67. Id. at 844 (footnotes omitted), For a full discussion of the survivability
of the right of publicity, see Sims, supra note 8.

68. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
69. Id.
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who received an assignment from Presley of his publicity rights
when he was alive, sought to enjoin a corporation's manufacture,
sale and distribution of eight-inch pewter replicas of the deceased
entertainer.70 The Sixth Circuit held that, although Presley's
publicity rights could be assigned by him during his lifetime, 71
72
they could not descend after his death to his heirs or his assignees.
The court reasoned that publicity law was analogous to defamation
law and observed that:
The two interests that support the inheritability of the
right of publicity, namely, the "effort and creativity" and
the "hopes and expectations" of the decedent, would also
support an action for libel or slander .

. .

.

Neither of

these reasons, however, is sufficient to overcome the common law policy terminating the action for defamation
73
upon death.
As courts have experimented with the contours of a propertybased publicity interest, some courts and commentators have
expressly qualified their recognition of a property-like publicity
concept on the condition that the celebrity exercise his publicity
rights during his lifetime. 74 For example, in Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures,7 5 the heirs of Bela Lugosi sued a movie company for invasion of their right of publicity in Lugosi's portrayal of Count
70. Id. at 957.
71. Id. at 960.
72. Id. at 957.
73. Id. at 959. The court further observed that recognizing a survivable
publicity right would create a whole set of practical problems in judicial linedrawing-problems such as taxing and timing such a right. Id. The court
opined that it was "fairer and more efficient for the commercial, aesthetic, and
political use of the name, memory and image of the famous to be open to all
rather than to be monopolized by a few." Id. at 960.
74. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221-22 &
n.l1 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Hicks v. Casablanca
Records & Filmworks, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see
Comment, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity upon the Death of the
Famous, supra note 3, at 1263.
One court has defined the exercise of publicity rights as "act[ing] in such
a way as to evidence [one's] own recognition of the extrinsic commercial value
of [one's] name or likeness, and [to manifest] that recognition in some overt
manner, e.g., making an inter vivos transfer of the rights in the name . ..
or posing for bubble gum cards .... ." Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citations omitted). For a
discussion of the exercise or exploitation requirement in publicity law, see
Sims, supra note 8, at 472-84; Premature Burial, supra note 3, at 1003-06.
75. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (en banc).
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Dracula.7 6 The Supreme Court of California found for the defendant and refused to recognize a property-based right of publicity
which descended to Lugosi's heirs because of the absence of any
exploitation of the publicity right by the celebrity. 77 The Lugosi
court reasoned that "[i]f rights to the exploitation of artistic or intellectual property never exercised during the lifetime of their
creators were to survive their death, neither society's interest in the
free dissemination of ideas nor the artist's rights to the fruits of his
own labor would be served." 78
Despite California's adoption of only a conditional right of
publicity in Lugosi, an emerging number of states have been less
restrictive in recognizing a property right of publicity, and have
set forth justifications different from Haelan.79 For example, in
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,80 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the plaintiff had a protectable property interest
in his nickname "Crazylegs" when the defendant-manufacturer
appropriated the name for its shaving gel product."' The Hirsch
court justified its adoption of a property publicity right by explaining that "[p]rotection of the publicity value of one's name
is supported by public policy considerations, such as the interest in controlling the effect on one's reputation of commercial
uses of one's personality and the prevention of unjust enrichment
of those who appropriate the publicity value of another's
identity." 82
76. Id. at 816-17, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
77. Id. at 823-24, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
78. Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.

79. For a review of the Haelan decision and its enunciation of the publicity doctrine, see notes 59-62 and accompanying text supra.
80. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
81. Id. at 382, 280 N.W.2d at 130.
82. Id. at 391, 280 N.W.2d at 134, citing Treece, Commercial Exploitation
of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 Tax. L. REv. 637, 637 (1973).
For states in addition to Wisconsin recognizing a property right of publicity,
see McQueen v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 488, 161 S.E.2d 63 (Ct. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 224 Ga. 420, 162 S.E.2d 313 (1968); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc.,
97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 439, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012 (App. Div. 1981); Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Courts and commentators have sought to provide legal protection for the
right of publicity by suggesting several possible remedies for its infringement:
1) New value received by the defendant-the plaintiff can recover the "value
received by the defendant by virtue of the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's
name or likeness." Performers' Style, supra note 8, at 137 (footnote omitted).
2) Diverted profits from the plaintiff-the plaintiff can recover his pecuniary
loss resulting from the defendant's use of his name and likeness. See
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To summarize, after the initial introduction of a property
right of publicity by Haelan in 1954,83 courts have divided into
three broad categories with respect to the publicity doctrine's content. The first category consists of courts which have adopted a
full-fledged and unconditional property right of publicity which is
fully assignable and survivable.8 4 The second category includes
courts which have adopted a quasi-property right of publicity
which is assignable but not survivable.8 5 The last category encompasses courts which have recognized a conditional right of
publicity which is fully survivable if the right's owner exercised
the right during his lifetime.86
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3838 (1982) (plaintiff seeks diverted profits as recovery). 3) Equitable accounting for defendant's profits-the plaintiff can recover all of the defendant's
profits resulting from the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name or likeness
regardless of the defendant's contribution of time, money or effort. D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 252-54 (1973) (emphasis added).
4) Compensation for dilution of plaintiff's publicity-the plaintiff can recover
a sum to compensate for any impairment or dilution of his publicity value
resulting from the defendant's unauthorized use. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 391, 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (1979); Note, Performer's
Right of Publicity: A Limitation on News Privilege, supra note 19, at 601.
5) Punitive or exemplary damages-the plaintiff can recover a sum in excess of
his damages as a punishment to the wrongdoer if malicious intent can be
proven. Cf. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (punitive damages denied because plaintiff unable to show malicious
intent). 6) A quasi-contractual recovery-the court can imply a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, and order the defendant to pay a
reasonable royalty for his unlicensed use of the plaintiff's property right under
the quasi-contract. For a discussion of the quasi-contract recovery theory in
right of publicity cases, see Treece, supra note 82, at 648-52. 7) Injunctionthe plaintiff can obtain an injunction against further unauthorized use of his
name or likeness by the defendant. See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp.
1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
83. For a review of the Haelan decision, see notes 59-62 and accompanying
text supra.
84. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding right of publicity survives death even in the absence of assignment or
exploitation of the right). For a discussion of Price, see notes 64-67 and
accompanying text supra.
85. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (holding that right of publicity, while apparently assignable, could not survive death). But see Commercial Union
Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc. (Tenn. Ch. App. Oct. 2, 1981), reprinted in 557 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-3 (Oct. 2, 1981) (right
of publicity survivable in Tennessee irrespective of Memphis Development).
For a discussion of Memphis Development, see notes 68-73 and accompanying
text supra.
86. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (en banc) (publicity rights which are unexercised by their
original owner during his lifetime could not descend). For a discussion of
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C. The United States Supreme Court and the Right of
Publicity: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court addressed and
vindicated a right of publicity claim for the first time in Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 87

In Zacchini, a television

station broadcast a stunt performer's "human cannonball" act
in its entirety during the local evening news.8 8 The performer
sued the station for misappropriation of his personal property
under a state common law right of publicity action. 9 The station asserted a first amendment privilege to broadcast newsworthy
events.9 0 The Zacchini Court found for the plaintiff-performer
on his right of publicity claim, 91 and held that the first amendment did not privilege the station to televise the "entire act" of the
Lugosi, see notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
requirement of the exercise of publicity rights, see note 74 supra.
87. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). For a complete discussion of Zacchini, see Note,
Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. SCripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Human
Cannonballs]; Note, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.: Media
Appropriation, the First Amendment and State Regulation, 1977 UTAH L.
REV. 817 (1977). Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Powell submitted a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined. Justice Stevens dissented separately. For additional discussion of the
majority opinion in Zacchini, as well as the dissents of Justices Powell and
Stevens, see notes 165-174 and accompanying text infra.
88. 433 U.S. at 563-64. The cannonball act lasted for a total of only 15
seconds. Id. at 563. The following script was read by a reporter as a film of
Zacchini's performance was broadcast:
This ... now ... is the story of a true spectator sport . . . the sport
of human cannonballing . . . in fact, the great Zacchini is about
the only human cannonball around, these days . . . just happens that,
where he is, the Great Geauga County Fair, in Burton . . . and
believe me, although it's not a long act, it's a thriller . . . and you
really need to see it in person . . . to appreciate it ....
Id. at 564 n.1 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 564. The plaintiff asserted a common law right of publicity
claim under Ohio state law, but the trial court granted summary judgment
for the television station. Id. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed and
held that the plaintiff-performer stated a good cause of action for conversion
and for infringement of a common-law copyright. Id.
On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Ohio noted that the plaintiff-performer's cause of action
properly rested on his state law right of publicity value in his performance, but
held that the defendant-station enjoyed a first amendment privilege to broadcast newsworthy events. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47
Ohio St. 2d 244, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
90. See Brief for Respondent, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), reprinted at 53 L. Ed. 2d 1302-03 (1977).
91. 433 U.S. at 574-77.
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performer, 92 and thereby stifle the "heart of [the plaintiff's] ability
to earn a living . . . . 93
In supporting a state common law publicity right under the
facts of Zacchini,. the Court discussed the nature and rationale for
a right of publicity. First, the Court emphasized the economic
and commercial value of a publicity right's subject-matter, and the
need to shield this value from "substantial threat." 94 Second,
the Court, in distinguishing publicity actions from privacy actions,
observed that "the State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual,"
and has "little to do with protecting feelings or reputation" as in
privacy law. 5 Further, the Court noted that the "rationale for
[protecting the right of publicity] is the straightforward one ol
preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will." 96
In addition, the Court analogized the goal of publicity law
with that of the patent and copyright laws-the "encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain . . . [and advancement of]
the public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in 'Science and useful Arts.' " 97 In sum, Zacchini represents an
important milestone in the development of publicity law because
it embodies Supreme Court recognition of a property-based right
of publicity, and because it resulted in Supreme Court validation
of a particular publicity claim in the face of a typically fatal first
98
amendment challenge.
III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE TO A RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY ACTION

The first amendment 99 to the United States Constitution is
often asserted as a defense to an action for infringement of the
92. Id. at 574-75. For a discussion of the "entire act" standard in Zacchini,
see notes 175-78 and accompanying text infra.
93. 433 U.S. at 576.
94. 433 U.S. at 575.
95. Id. at 573.
96. Id. at 576, quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 326, 331 (1966). The Court
added that "[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant get free
some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he
would normally pay." Id.
97. 433 U.S. at 576, quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
Federal patent and copyright laws emanate from Congress' power to grant
copyright protection under the copyright clause of the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
98. See notes 87-97 and accompanying text supra.
99. For the text of the first amendment, see note 9 supra.
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right of publicity. 10 0 The first amendment, in part, guarantees
the right of free speech to all citizens.' 0 ' Under that rubric, the
amendment provides constitutional protection for any nondefamatory speech which informs the public about political, social or
newsworthy issues, 10 2 and for any nondefamatory speech which expands society's cultural experience by producing entertaining,
creative or even whimsical expression. 0 3 Courts which are confronted with accommodating the right of publicity claim and the
constitutional free-speech privilege must necessarily engage in the
10 4
task of judicial line-drawing and policy-making.
100. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. For cases involving the
assertion of a first amendment defense, see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Groucho Marx
Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Estate
of Presley v, Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Ann-Margret v. High
Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lerman v. Chuckleberry
Publishing, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 521 F. Snpp.
228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, Inc., 464 F.
Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d
860, 862, 603 P.2d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App.
Div. 1980) (mem. decision); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d
444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1968).
In addition to a first amendment defense, other constitutional defenses to a
right of publicity action are possible. First, a defendant who is making use
of a plaintiff's name or likeness can assert a "free trade interest in keeping the
names and likenesses of . . . celebrities in the public domain." Sims, supra
note 8, at 484. Arguably, a free trade interest could be constitutionally based
on the commerce clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. However, such an
argument has not figured prominently in the defenses of alleged violators of
publicity rights. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Sims,
supra note 8, at 485 n.149.
Second, a defendant who is making use of a plaintiff's name or likeness
in the context of a media communication can assert, strictly speaking, a separate first amendment freedom of the press defense. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
For discussions of freedom of the press, see L. LEvy, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON

(1966); H.

NELSON,

FREEDOM OF THE

PREss

FROM

(1967). However, in view of the fact that a
free press defense is generally joined with a free speech defense whenever
either is asserted, and that the same analysis takes place under both defenses,
this comment deals with both together under a first amendment category.
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For discussions of the free speech guarantee, see note 9 and authorities cited therein.
102. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1597.
103. Id. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562, 578 (1977) ("There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news,
enjoys First Amendment protection"). For a discussion of Zacchini and the
first amendment, see notes 165-69 and accompanying text infra.
104. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956,
959 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT

25 Cal. 3d 813, 827, 603 P.2d 425, 433, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 331 (1979) (Mosk, J.,

concurring).
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A. The First Amendment Collides with the Right of Publicity:
Conflict in the Case Law
Those courts which have been called upon to demarcate the
boundaries between the publicity and free speech doctrines have
produced less than uniform results. 105 Decisions illustrating the
tension in judicial resolution of these controversies have been
rendered in several factual contexts. The three most common
areas have involved unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name or
likeness to impart newsworthy information, 1°6 to provide entertainment, 10 7 and to engage in commercial sales. 108
Courts and commentators have suggested several points at which the line
between the right of publicity and the first amendment privilege can be
drawn. One view would permit a first amendment privilege to appropriate
all but the "entire act" of the plaintiff's right of publicity. See Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977). For a discussion
of Zacchini and the entire act test, see notes 175-78 and accompanying text
infra. A second view would permit a privilege to appropriate only those
aspects of the plaintiff's publicity rights which serve traditional free speech
functions, such as newsworthiness or entertainment. See Note, First Amendment Theory Applied to the Right of Publicity, 19 B.C.L. REV. 277, 291
(1975). A third view would permit a privilege to appropriate all but a
"material or substantial" part of the plaintiff's publicity rights. Id. A fourth
view would permit a privilege to appropriate aspects of the plaintiff's publicity
which are matters of legitimate public interest, unless the plaintiff could show
that the appropriation was a "subterfuge or cover for private or commercial
exploitation." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
581 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Cf. Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 235, 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (1976),
rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (Ohio Supreme Court standard for limiting first
amendment privilege). For a discussion of Justice Powell's dissent in Zacchini,
see notes 170-74 and accompanying text infra.
Stated another way, the problem of drawing lines between the right of publicity and the free speech privilege, and determining where one ends and the
other begins, is essentially the Hohfeldian problem of defining and relating
legal categories, such as, in this instance, the categories of right and privilege.
For Professor Hohfeld, a right was the opposite of a no-right which, in turn,
was a correlative of a privilege. For a full discussion of the meaning and
relationship between these categories, see Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1923).
105. See notes 109-49 and accompanying text infra.
106. See notes 109-29 and accompanying text infra. Newsworthy information is generally accorded a high level of first amendment protection. See
Sims, supra note 8, at 486. Newsworthy information can be imparted through
a wide variety of mediums including books, newspapers, magazines, radio, and
television. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1597-98.
107. See notes 130-49 and accompanying text infra. The Supreme Court
has stated: "There is no doubt that entertainment ... enjoys First Amendment
protection." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578
1977). Entertainment materials having first amendment protection include
ction, biography, history, mimicry, parody, and stage, motion picture, and
television productions. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1598.
108. See notes 150-64 and accompanying text infra. Commercial products
and merchandise are not generally considered to have a high level of first
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1. Newsworthy Information
Judicial confusion in addressing the publicity and free speech
problem within the context of newsworthy information is manifested in several decisions under New York law. 1'
In Paulsen v.
PersonalityPosters, Inc.,"0 the Supreme Court of New York County
adopted an expansive view of the first amendment privilege for
publicity items. In Paulsen, the plaintiff, a television comedian
conducting a mock campaign for the Presidency in 1968, sought
to enjoin the defendant, a marketing corporation, from producing
a commercial poster depicting the plaintiff in an unflattering
pose."' The Paulsen court held that the poster conveyed a message of public interest, even if satirical, and therefore fell within
the ambit of newsworthiness because "[t]he privilege of enlightening the public is by no means limited to dissemination of news
in the sense of current events but extends far beyond to include
all types of factual, educational and historical data, or even entertainment and amusement, concerning interesting phases of human
activity in general." 112
amendment protection. See Sims, supra note 8, at 492 8c n.194. See also
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 874, 603 P.2d 454, 463,
160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 361 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (commercial products not
vehicles through which ideas and opinions are regularly disseminated). But cf.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (free speech, even in commercial context, entitled
to constitutional protection).
109. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc.
2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1968). See also Kulzik & Hogue,
supra note 14, at 61.
110. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1968).
111. Id. at 445, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04. The court described the poster
as follows:
A soulfully expressioned plaintiff attired in beruffled cap and prim
frock, in a style which might best be characterized as "latter-day
Edna May Oliver," is shown holding an unlit candle in one hand
while his other arm cradles a rubber tire which is hoisted onto his
right shoulder. A contemporary touch is added by a banner draped
across the plaintiff's chest, in the manner, if not the style, of a beauty
pageant contestant, which bears the legend "1968" . . . with the
addition of the words "FOR PRESIDENT" at the bottom in 2V12 letters.
Id., 299 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
112. Id. at 448, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 506. The Paulsen court ruled in favor
of the first amendment interest, and refused to issue an injunction against the
defendant's production of the poster. Id. at 452, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 510. It
should be noted that a subsequent case attempted to limit the holding of
Paulsen to its facts. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc.
2d 788, 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.), modified per curiam,
42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973). For a discussion of this
case, see notes 152-56 and accompanying text infra.
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Almost a decade later, the Second Circuit, construing New
York law, adopted an apparently narrower view of the first amendment privilege in a cryptic opinion passing on another right of
publicity case dealing with purportedly newsworthy posters. In
Factors Etc., inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,11 the defendants, two corporations, apparently sought to take advantage of the popular demand
for Elvis Presley memorabilia immediately following the entertainer's death, and produced a memorial poster of Presley with an
appropriate caption." 4 The plaintiff, the assignee of Presley's
publicity rights, sued to enjoin the defendants' appropriation of
the entertainer's name and likeness."1 5 The defendants asserted
that their poster depicted a newsworthy event, and was therefore
protected under the first amendment, as in Paulsen."6 The court
rejected any analogy to Paulsen, and held, with little first amendment analysis, that the "poster of Presley was not privileged as
celebrating a newsworthy event." 117
For cases other than Paulsen deeming materials to have first amendment
newsworthiness in the context of suits alleging various theories of appropriation, see Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(Abraham Zabruder film of President John F. Kennedy's assassination newsworthy); Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d 406, 267 N.E.2d 256,
318 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1971) (plaintiff's picture on magazine cover newsworthy because photograph related to news story); Donohue v. Warner Bros. Pictures
Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 117 (1954) (Jack Donohue's portrayal
in movie protected in part as informational); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48
A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (App. Div. 1975) (Joe Namath's photograph used
to advertise sports magazine newsworthy where magazine carried news stories
about Namath); Rand v. Hearst Corp., 31 A.D.2d 406, 298 N.Y.S.2d 405 (App.
Div. 1969) (Ann Rand's name, which appeared in a book review, a matter of
public interest and information); Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc.
2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1972) (defendant's newsmagazine
with a phonograph record of an Elvis Presley news conference deemed newsworthy). For other cases deeming materials not to have newsworthiness, see
note 117 infra.
113. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'g and remanding, Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979). In conjunction with the lower court opinion in Factors, see the
companion case of Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). On remand of the Factors case, the trial court considered
additional defenses asserted by the defendants, but ultimately decided to issue
a permanent injunction against the defendant's activities. See Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). On a second appeal
to the Second Circuit, this decision was reversed on other grounds. See
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (1982), noted in 27 VILL. L. REV. 393 (1982).
114. 579 F.2d at 217. The poster was entitled "IN MEMORY," and below
the photograph of Presley, the poster bore the dates "1935-1977." Id.
115. Id. at 216-17.
116. Id. at 222. For a discussion of Paulsen, see notes 110-12 and accompanying text supra.
117. The Second Circuit's rationale for rejecting the first amendment hold.
ing of Paulsen consisted of one sentence. The court stated: "We cannot accept
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Two recent decisions by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York also illustrate the continuing tension in
publicity cases dealing with newsworthiness under the first amendment. 118

In Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.,119 the

court took the view that publicity actions must be so circumscribed as " 'to avoid any conflict with the free dissemination of
thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events and matters of public interest'
guaranteed by the First Amendment." 120 In Ann-Margret, the
plaintiff-movie actress sued a defendant-publisher who printed a
partially nude photograph of the plaintiff in a magazine. 121 The
Ann-Margret court held that a picture of a famous movie actress
appearing partially unclad constitutes an item within the "orbit
of public interest and scrutiny," 122 and that therefore such a picture could not "under the First Amendment ... provide the basis

for a cause of action for violation of the right to publicity."

123

Pro Arts' contention that the legend

"IN MEMORY . . ." placed its poster in the
same category as one picturing a presidential candidate, albeit a mock candidate." Id. The court affirmed the trial court's issuance of an injunction. Id.
For other cases declining to find a first amendment newsworthiness in
various materials, see Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no
newsworthiness in nude portrait of Muhammad Ali); Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,
367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (no newsworthiness in Cary Grant's photograph when used in connection with magazine article about clothing styles);
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1967) (no newsworthiness in board game manufacturer's use of names
and biographies of famous golfers when used in a board game).
118. See Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.
N.Y. 1981), modifying, 494 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ann-Margret v. High
Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The decisions bear
out the view of one commentator that newsworthiness, in the context of the
first amendment, is an illusory concept. See Note, Freedom of Expression in
a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191 (1965).
119. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
120. Id. at 404, quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967) (plaintiff's claim must avoid any conflict with first amendment interests). See also
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d
122, 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1968), a/I'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Div. 1969) ("the 'right of publicity' [must] bow where such conflicts with
the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of
public interest"). But cf. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time:
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 935, 957-58 (1968) ("the right of publicity . . . may not be
freely plundered under the banner of the first amendment") (footnotes omitted).
121. 498 F. Supp. at 403-04. The plaintiff-movie actress asserted two
theories of recovery, an invasion of her statutory right of privacy, and violation
of her common law right of publicity. Id. at 404.
122. Id. at 405, quoting Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir.
1977).
123. Id. at 406 (footnote omitted). The Ann-Margret court dismissed the
plaintiff's action in its entirety. Id. at 408.
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Almost one year later, however, the same court, faced with a
similar set of facts, ruled against the first amendment and in favor
of publicity interests. In Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing,
Inc.,124 the court took the view, in contrast with Ann-Margret,
that a publicity action could lie where the unauthorized use of the
plaintiff's likeness was for a commercially exploitive effect, even
with the existence of an apparently newsworthy element involved
in the use. 12
In Lerman, a novelist brought suit against a publisher who printed a nude photograph, incorrectly identified as the
plaintiff, in a magazine. 26 The defendant's publication was purportedly reporting on the newsworthy event of well-known female
celebrities expressing sexual liberation. 127 The Lerman court conceded that such a matter was newsworthy. 2 8
Nevertheless, the
court ruled that the defendant's purpose was to enhance sales, and
that therefore the plaintiff's publicity claim should prevail. 29
2. EntertainmentMaterials
Discord in the publicity case law extends beyond the newsworthiness area and reaches decisions involving first amendment
protection for entertainment materials. Entertainment materials
such as fiction, satire and parody are as deserving of first amendment protection as newsworthy information as pointed out by Chief
Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court in Guglielmi
v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions."30 Chief Justice Bird remarked
that:
124. 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), modifying, 496 F. Supp. 1105
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
125. See generally id. at 232-34.
126. Id. at 230. The plaintiff-novelist and screenwriter asserted three
theories of recovery: libel, invasion of the statutory right of privacy, and
violation of the common law right of publicity. Id.
127. Id. at 234. The picture in question appeared in a pictorial essay
entitled "Archives" in the May 1980 issue of Adelina-the defendant's magazine.
Id.
128. Id. at 234.
129. Id. at 232-33. The court concluded that the plaintiff's claim contained no material issue of fact, and hence granted judgment for the plaintiff
as a matter of law. Id.
130. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 862, 603 P.2d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring). In Guglielmi, the heirs of Rudolph Valentino sued
the producers of a fictionalized television drama depicting the star's life story
for invasion of the right of publicity. Id. at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 353. A majority of the California Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint under the view that the publicity right in
California does not survive the owner's death in the absence of sufficient exploitation of the right. Id., citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813,
603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (en banc).
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Using fiction as a vehicle, commentaries on our values,
habits, customs, laws, prejudices, justice, heritage and
future are frequently expressed. What may be difficult to
communicate or understand when factually reported may
be poignant or powerful if offered in satire, science fiction
or parable. Indeed, Dickens and Dostoevski may well
have written more trenchant and comprehensive commentaries on their times than any factual recitation could
ever yield. Such authors are no less entitled to express
their views than the town crier with the daily news or the
philosopher with his discourse on the nature of justice.
Even the author who creates distracting tales for amuse13
ment is entitled to constitutional protection. '
However, in according entertainment materials appropriate first
amendment protection while at the same time giving effective protection to the right of publicity, courts have had difficulty in avoiding shifting results.

82

In Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, Inc., 13 3 the

District Court for the Southern District of New York afforded nearabsolute protection for non-falsified entertainment materials. In
Hicks, the plaintiffs, the heirs and assignees of the late mystery
writer Agatha Christie, sought to enjoin distribution of the defendants' book and movie called "Agatha," which presented a
13 4
fictionalized account of a true incident in the mystery writer's life.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird took the position that the
right of publicity is inheritable by the owner's heirs and protected for 50
years after the owner's death. Id. at 864, 603 P.2d at 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
355 (Bird, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Bird argued, however, that constitutional protections for works of fiction and entertainment precluded a finding
of liability on the part of the plaintiff. Id. at 863-72, 603 P.2d at 457-62, 160
Cal. Rptr. at 354-60 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
131. 25 Cal. 3d at 867-68, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring). But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 66-70
(1976) (suggesting that the content of a work may affect its constitutional protection). For a discussion of Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion in
Guglielmi, see Kulzick &: Hogue, supra note 14, at 63-64; Premature Burial,
supra note 3, at 1008-10.
132. Compare Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F.
Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling in favor of publicity doctrine) with Hicks v.
Casablanca Records & Filmworks, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (ruling
in favor of first amendment).
133. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
134. Id. at 428-29. The defendants' materials offered a fictionalized version
of the whereabouts and activities of Agatha Christie during her famous, but
mysterious, disappearance for eleven days in 1926. Id. at 429. The plaintiffs
asserted their publicity rights in the mystery writer's name and likeness in an
attempt to prevent release of the defendants' materials. Id.
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The Hicks court, while apparently balancing the first amendment
and publicity interests involved, held that, as to non-falsified fiction,
"the first amendment protection usually accorded novels and movies
outweighs whatever publicity rights plaintiffs may possess." 135
In 1981, the Southern District of New York retreated from its
position in Hicks, and ruled that non-falsified materials which
closely reproduce a publicity item for commercial gain are not protected by the first amendment. In Groucho Marx Productions,Inc.
v. Day and Night Co., 13 6 the assignees of the publicity rights

of the Marx Brothers sued to enjoin the defendants' production of
a musical play entitled "A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the
Ukraine." 137 The defendants contended that their play was a
parody of a Marx Brothers' performance, and was therefore protected by the first amendment. 138 The court was troubled by the
wholesale reproduction of the Marx Brothers characters, and held
that such a use of celebrities' names and likenesses renders the use
essentially for commercial purposes, and therefore without first
amendment protection. 3 9
Tension in the entertainment area of publicity law is also
reflected in two more recent decisions addressing the conflict with
the right of free speech.140

41
In Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc.,

the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, adopted a sweeping test for constitutional protection for literary materials-namely,
that the first amendment protected any literary work which was
not, in bad faith, a mask for commercial gain. In Frosch, the
executor of the film actress Marilyn Monroe sued the author and
publishers of a book entitled "Marilyn" for invasion of the dece135. Id. at 433, relying in part on University of Notre Dame Du Lacv.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App.
Div.), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965). The
Hicks court suggested that only if the defendants' materials had consisted of

deliberate falsifications would the scales of the balance tipped in favor of the
plaintiff's publicity interests and against the defendants' first amendment
interests. Id.
136. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
137. Id. at 486. The plaintiffs, asserting their common law right of
publicity to prevent the showing of the defendants' play, objected to the
play's reproduction of the Marx Brothers' mannerisms and style of humor. Id.
138. Id. at 492-93.
139. Id. at 493-94. The Groucho Marx court found that the defendants
had simply duplicated as faithfully as possible the Marx Brothers performances,
while conveying little biographical or informational content. See generally id.
140. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981);
Frosch v. Grosset 9cDunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div.
1980) (mem. decision).
141. 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1980) (mem. decision).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 6 [1982], Art. 4
1232

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 1205

dent's right of publicity. 142 The Frosch court ruled that the book

in question was "not simply a disguised commercial advertisement
for the sale of goods or services," and was therefore valid as 4a
literary work entitled to protection by the right of free expression.
In contrast with the Frosch court's broad language favoring
first amendment interests in the entertainment area of publicity
law, the District Court of New Jersey delivered a more restrictive
opinion in Estate of Presley v. Russen.144 In Russen, the court
adopted a balancing test for determining the validity of a free
speech claim in a publicity case.1 45 The Russen court was faced
with a suit by the estate of Elvis Presley to enjoin the defendantentertainer's appropriation of Presley's name and likeness in the
defendant's stage production-"THE BIG EL SHOW." 146 The Russen
court initially addressed the threshold question of whether the defendant's portrayal was sufficiently similar to Presley's actual name
or likeness for purposes of bringing a publicity action. 147 Ruling
that a publicity action was appropriate, the court then balanced
the free speech and publicity concerns involved. The court conceded that the defendant's appropriation contained an entertainment element, 14s but held that the appropriation primarily served
the purpose of commercial exploitation of Presley's publicity, and
49
therefore could not be shielded by the first amendment.
142. Id. The book "Marilyn" was purportedly a biography of the late
film actress. Id. at 768-69, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
143. Id. at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829. For other cases according materials
first amendment entertainment protection, see University of Notre Dame Du
Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301
(App. Div. 1965), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965)
(first amendment entertainment protection for movie satirizing events, people
and institutions at University of Notre Dame); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v.
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 85 Misc. 2d 583, 380 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.
1975) (first amendment entertainment protection for fictionalized autobiography
of Howard Hughes). For cases deeming materials not entitled to enjoy entertainment protection, see note 149 infra.
144. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
145. Id. at 1356.
146. Id. at 1344. The plaintiff asserted four theories of recovery: federal
law unfair competition, common law unfair competition, common law trademark infringement, and infringement of the right of publicity. Id.
147. Id. at 1348-49. The Russen court found, as a matter of fact, that the
defendant-entertainer's likeness, style, and performance were sufficiently similar
to Presley's. Id. The Russen court reasoned that "a reasonable viewer upon
seeing the pictures [of the defendant-entertainer] would likely believe the individual portrayed to be Elvis Presley." Id. at 1349. For a review of the sufficient similarity issue, see note 63 supra.
148. Id. at 1359.
149. Id.
The Russen court noted that "entertainment [as in the instant
case] that is merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and accurately carried
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3. Commercial Sales
Cases in the commercial sales area of publicity law present the
least first amendment difficulties. Unauthorized use of a celebrity's
name or likeness which serves no informative or cultural function
but which is only intended to promote the sale of merchandise is,

in the words of one commentator, "considered the very essence of
commercial exploitation," 150 and hence is deserving of little first
amendment protection.'"1 For example, in Rosemont Enterprises,
52
Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc.,1
the plaintiff was the corporate assignee of the publicity rights of billionaire recluse Howard
Hughes. 153 The plaintiff sought to enjoin various defendants from
the marketing and distribution of an adult educational career game
entitled "The Howard Hughes Game," which appropriated the
name and biography of Hughes. 54 The Urban Systems court
reasoned that "[i]n reality, defendants are not disseminating news.
They are not educating the public as to the achievements of Howard
out, does not really have its own creative component and does not have a
significant value as pure entertainment." Id. (footnote omitted). The court
emphasized the view of one commentator that:
The public interest in entertainment will support the sporadic,
occasional and good faith imitation of a famous person to achieve
humor, to effect criticism or to season a particular episode, but it does
not give a privilege to appropriate another's valuable attributes on a
continuing basis as one's own without the consent of the other.
Id. at 1359-60, citing Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody,
Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 254 (1962).
For cases in addition to Russen in which works of entertainment have lost
a claim of first amendment protection, see Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18
N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated and remanded,
387 U.S. 239, afJ'd on remand, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d
832 (1967) (no first amendment protection for biography published with knowledge of falsification or with reckless disregard for truth); Polakoff v. Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2516 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1978)
(no immunity for fictionalized novel naming and describing plaintiff). For
cases finding materials to be entitled to first amendment entertainment protection, see note 143 supra.
Although the Russen court found that the defendant's representation was
not protected by the first amendment, the court refused to issue an injunction
restraining the defendant's stage show because the plaintiff had not adequately
demonstrated any identifiable harm or loss of commercial benefits. Id. at 1379.
The court noted, for instance, that neither the plaintiff nor its licensees could
show that their ability to enter into agreements to license the use of Presley's
name or likeness was seriously jeopardized by the defendant's activities. Id.
For a review of the identifiable harm requirement in publicity law, see note
63 supra.
150. Sims, supra note 8, at 492-93 (footnote omitted).
151. Id. See also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1599.
152. 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.), modified per
curiam, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973).
153. Id. at 789, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
154. Id.
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Hughes. They are selling a commodity, a commercial product, an
entertaining game of chance." 155 Consequently, the court ruled
that the plantiff was entitled to relief. 156
The plaintiff in Urban Systems also successfully brought suit
to enjoin the unauthorized use of Howard Hughes' name and like-7
1
ness in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Choppy Productions, Inc. 5
In Choppy Productions, the plaintiff objected to the defendants'
manufacture, distribution, and sale of T-shirts, sweatshirts, and
other items bearing Hughes' image, along with comical and satirical
comments about his lifestyle.' 5 8 The Choppy Productions court
granted judgment for the plaintiff, and concluded that there was
"no validity in [the defendant's] argument that [the appropriation]
is protected by the constitutional right of free speech." 159
Although these cases confirm the view that little first amendment protection is given to the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's
publicity rights in the commercial context, the conclusion that free
speech interests are wholly inapplicable may be inappropriate.
Commercial speech, such as in advertising for a product, is not
totally devoid of first amendment protection. 6 0 Further, commercial appropriations of a plaintiff's name or likeness are rarely for
the sole purpose of advancing sales, but are typically mixed with a
biographical function, 16' or an informational element. 62 Lastly,
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
74
Id.

at 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
at 791, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
Misc. 2d 1003, 347 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1972).
at 1004, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 84. The "message" behind the Howard

Hughes T-shirts was the idea that vast sums of money do not necessarily bring
happiness or social ease-a "pertinent statement within our free enterprise
system." Sims, supra note 8, at 496.
159. 74 Misc. 2d at 1005, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 85.

For other opinions in

which commercial items have failed to receive any first amendment protection,
see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,

440 U.S. 908 (1979) (memorial poster sold as a commercial item entitled to no
first amendment protection); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super.
72, 232 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (board game appropriating names
and biographies of well-known golfers entitled to no first amendment protection). For a discussion of the Factors case, see notes 113-17 and accompanying text supra.
160. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (free speech, even in commercial context,
entitled to first amendment protection). See also Sims, supra note 8, at 492
& n.192.
161. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.

N.Y. Cty.), modified per curiam, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345

N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973) (sale of Howard Hughes game mixed with dissemination of Hughes' biography). For a discussion of Urban Systems, see
notes 152-56 and accompanying text supra.
162. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 74 Misc. 2d 1003,
347 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1972) (sale of Howard Hughes T-shirts
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celebrity merchandise and memorabilia may well constitute an important form of protected "symbolic speech," 163 and make a unique
contribution to the "marketplace of ideas." 164 Consequently, the
first amendment problem in the commercial sales area of publicity
law, although not as pronounced, may well exist on a subdued level.
B. The United States Supreme Court and the First Amendment
Parameter to the Right of Publicity: Zacchini Revisited
In Zacchini,16 5 the Supreme Court squarely addressed the inherent tension between the right of publicity and the first amendment. The Zacchini Court held that a first amendment news
privilege did not shield a television station which broadcasted the
"entire act" of a stunt performer from an action by that performer
asserting a state common law right of publicity to protect his performance. 16 The Court emphasized the proprietary aspect of the
right of publicity, 16 7 and opined that the first amendment could not
be used to threaten the entire economic value of the plaintiffperformer's act.",8 The Court confirmed that "entertainment, as
well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection," and that "entertainment itself can be important news," but ultimately decided
that the appropriation, in Zacchini, had simply gone too far. 169
Justice Powell submitted a strong dissenting opinion arguing
that the Zacchini majority was not "appropriately sensitive to the
First Amendment values at stake." 170 In Justice Powell's view, the
mixed with dissemination of an informational message). For a discussion of
Choppy Productions, see notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra.
163. "Symbolic speech" is protected first amendment activity. See, e.g.,
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). It has been suggested that
public display of celebrity memorabilia, depicting stars like actor John Wayne
or Olympic runner Jesse Owens, may well express symbolic speech. See Sims,
supra note 8, at 495-96.
164. It has been suggested that mass-purchased celebrity memorabilia, depicting stars like actresses Jane Fonda and Vanessa Redgrave who are associated
with specific political causes, may well enable the public to become "speakers"
of an idea and to engage in "mass expression."
See Sims, supra note 8, at
494-96.
165. For a review of the facts and holding of Zacchini, see notes 87-93 and
accompanying text supra.
166. 433 U.S. at 562, 574-75.
167. See generally id. at 573-75. For a discussion of Zacchini and the
property right of publicity concept, see notes 87-98 and accompanying text
supra.
168. 433 U.S. at 575.
169. Id. at 578-79.
170. Id. at 579-80 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id.
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television station's broadcast of the plaintiff's act in the context of
a news program was simply "a routine example of the press' fulfilling the informing function so vital to our system." 171 Justice
Powell suggested that the majority's holding could raise the spectre
of media self-censorship by prompting news editors to refrain from
portraying information which might be construed as the "entire
act." 172 The dissent attacked the "entire act" standard set forth
by the majority as unclear "even for resolution of this case," and
expressed doubt as to just what the "entire act" constituted. 173 In
contrast with the majority, the dissent "would hold that the First
Amendment protects the station from a 'right of publicity' or 'appropriation' suit, absent a strong showing by the plaintiff that the
news broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private or commercial
exploitation."

14

The entire act standard carved out by the Zacchini majority
represents one method by which to determine the division between
the right of publicity and the first amendment. However, it has
been condemned by commentators as being a "mechanical and
poorly conceived test," 175 and as being limited to the particular
facts in Zacchini.176 The test may well be overbroad in that it
171. Id. at 580 (Powell, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 580-81 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that
media self-censorship, or at least "watered down" reporting, would most likely
arise in situations where a news station is contemplating broadcasting events
such as a circus, sports competitions of limited duration, or short dramatic
skits. Id. & n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). If censorship or diluted reporting did
occur, Justice Powell declared that "[t]he public is then the loser." Id. at 581
(Powell, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 579 & n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The dissent suggested that even under the entire act standard, the full performance of
the plaintiff may not have been appropriated since the "act" includes items
such as the audience fanfare, the introduction of the performer, description
of the uniqueness and danger of the performance, commentary from the master
of ceremonies, and so on. Id. at 579 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also
Human Cannonballs, supra note 87, at 1203.
174. 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice
Stevens submitted a separate dissenting opinion in Zacchini in which he noted
that the basis of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision was unclear. Id. at 583
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The state court opinion could be read as either resting
on first amendment grounds, or on pure state common-law right of publicity
grounds. Id. Under these circumstances, Justice Stevens argued that the case
should be remanded to the Ohio Supreme Court "for clarification of its holding
before deciding the federal constitutional issue." Id.
175. Note, State "Copyright" Protection for Performers: The First Amendment Question, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1978). But see Privacy, Appropriation, supra note 3, at 605 (describing Zacchini test as valid and reasonable).
176. See Note, supra note 175, at 1231. See also Sims, supra note 8, at 487;
Human Cannonballs, supra, note 87, at 1189-1204. But see Comment, Constitutional Law-Privacy Torts-FirstAmendment Does Not Privilege Violation of
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would preclude a first amendment privilege in cases where the
"public interest may be better served by infringement of an entire
performance." 177 Further, it remains unclear after Zacchini whether
a less-than-entire appropriation of a plaintiff's publicity rights can
178
be protected under a first amendment privilege.
IV.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

179
The decisions of state and federal courts across the country,
as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini,"s0 have pointedly recognized a plaintiff's right of publicity in protecting the
commercial value of his name and likeness.' 8 ' Although courts and
commentators have differed on issues such as the publicity right's
doctrinal basis and descendibility,"s2 an emerging number of jurisdictions appear to favor at least a proprietary or property-like basis
8
for the publicity doctrine. 3
Modern cases in which a plaintiff asserts his right of publicity
4
typically include a first amendment versus free speech issue."8
Some courts, faced with a confrontation between the right of publicity and the first amendment, have ruled in favor of the first
amendment in broad language."85 Other courts, faced with the

Right of Publicity-Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 31 RUTGERS
L. REV. 269, 307 &: n.354 (1978) (suggesting Zacchini may well be applied
beyond its facts).
177. Note, supra note 175, at 1224. One commentator provides an illustration of this idea. "[A] broadcaster might endeavor to expose Zacchini as
a charlatan who uses wires and mirrors to perform his act. The public's
interest in scrutiny of the act might only be served by a film covering every
aspect of the act from the preparation of the cannon through Zacchini's landing." Human Cannonballs, supra note 87, at 1203 (emphasis added).
178. But cf. Note, supra note 175, at 1224 n.136 (suggesting that a lessthan-entire appropriation is entitled to a first amendment privilege). Accord,
Premature Burial, supra note 3, at 1008.
One commentator has warned that the lack of clarity in the entire act test,
and in its imprecision in addressing the competing interests of the publicity
right's owner and the first amendment actor, "invites injury to first amendment
principles." Human Cannonballs, supra note-87, at 1202.
179. See notes 59-86 and accompanying text supra.
180. See notes 87-98 and accompanying text supra.
181. For a review of the definition of the right of publicity, see text accompanying note 3 supra. For various discussions of the right of publicity, see
authorities cited in note 3 supra.
182. For a review of these issues, see note 8 supra.
183. See notes 54-86 and accompanying text supra.
184. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra. For a review of several
representative cases, see notes 110-49 and accompanying text supra.
185. See Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. at 404,
quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967) (plaintiff's claim must
" 'avoid any conflict with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, news-
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same problem under not dissimilar facts, have decided on behalf
of the right of publicity.""' To reconcile the inherent conflict between the publicity doctrine and free speech, it is suggested that
courts should employ the following three-pronged analysis to guide
187
them in reaching principled resolutions in future cases.
A. The Degree of Similarity Between the Defendant's
Representation and the Subject-Matter of the
Plaintiff's Right of Publicity
The threshold question in any case encompassing a conflict
between the right of publicity and first amendment free speech
should be whether the defendant's representation of a name or likeness is similar enough to the instant plaintiff's actual name or
likeness so that there exists a legally cognizable conflict which must
be resolved. 18 The initial similarity inquiry is, in essence, an
worthy events, and matters of public interest' guaranteed by the First Amendment"). For a discussion of Ann-Margret, see notes 119-23 and accompanying
text supra. See also Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d at 448,
299 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (first amendment interests are "by no means limited to
dissemination of news . . . but [extend] far beyond to include all types of
factual, educational and historical data, or even entertainment and amusement,
concerning interesting phases of human activity in general"). For a discussion
of Paulsen, see notes 110-12 and accompanying text supra.
186. See Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.
N.Y. 1981), modifying, 494 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ruling in favor of
right of publicity). For a discussion of Lerman, see notes 124-29 and accompanying text supra. See also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978) (ruling in favor of right of
publicity). For a discussion of Factors, see notes 113-17 and accompanying
text supra.
187. See notes 188-207 and accompanying text infra.
It is suggested that the elements of this analysis have been, and should
be, employed on an ad hoc basis under the facts of each case where the
interests of publicity and free speech conflict. However, in contrast with this
"ad hoc balancing" of interests approach, some commentators favor the application of a "definitional balancing" of interests approach in publicity cases.
See Note, First Amendment Theory Applied to the Right of Publicity, supra
note 104, at 288-90. Under a definitional balancing theory, the court undertakes a balancing of interests between the plaintiff and the defendant, not in
reconciling their conflicting publicity and free speech assertions, but in the
determination of whether the defendant is actually asserting a valid free
speech claim. If a valid free speech assertion is made, that constitutional claim
will always prevail over a non-constitutional publicity claim. Id. at 285-88.
188. For one court addressing this threshold issue, see Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1348-49. For a discussion of Russen, see notes 144-49
and accompanying text supra. If a court should find that a defendant's
representation is not sufficiently similar to the plaintiff's name or likeness, then
no right of publicity action exists, and the first amendment problem is never
reached. For a discussion of the sufficient similarity issue, along with illustrative cases, see note 63 supra.
In addition to the similarity issue, three other threshold questions in
publicity cases must be addressed. First, the defendant's appropriation of the
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inquiry into degree, and therefore, of necessity, calls for a judgmental conclusion by the appropriate fact-finder.18 9 In making this
similarity conclusion, it is suggested that several uniform and relevant factors must be considered. These factors include: 1) the
physical appearance of the likenesses; 190 2) the verbal translations
of the likenesses; 191 3) the pronounciation of the names; 192 4) suggestions generated by the names and likenesses; 193 5) the intent of
the defendant in making his infringing representation; 194 and 6)
the degree of care likely to be exercised by an observer. 19 5
B. The Primary Purpose Behind the Defendant's Representation
Secondly, the primary purpose behind the defendant's representation should be analyzed to determine what level of free speech
protection is appropriate. Broadly speaking, the level of first
amendment protection accorded to a defendant's representation
should depend upon the extent to which it serves traditional free
speech functions. 196 A number of courts have already employed a
"primary purpose" analysis in an attempt to rationally divide the
publicity doctrine and free speech.' 97 These courts have classified
"primary purpose" into three broad categories which, in descending
plaintiff's name and likeness must constitute a non-incidental use to warrant
recovery. For a discussion of the incidental use rule, along with illustrative
cases, see note 63 supra. Second, there must be a showing of an identifiable
commercial harm to the plaintiff's interests or a tangible commercial benefit to
the defendant's interests before recovery is justified. For a discussion of the
identifiable harm requirement, along with illustrative cases, see note 63 supra.
Third, the defendant's activity must proximately cause the harm to the plaintiff
or the benefit to the defendant before relief will be granted. For a discussion
of the proximate cause inquiry, along with illustrative cases, see note 63 supra.
189. Due to the nature of the similarity inquiry, it is suggested that the
actual question in the inquiry becomes: what quantum of similarity is necessary
for a court to deem that a right of publicity action exists, and that the first
amendment issue must be reached? For contrasting quantums of similarity
adopted by courts, compare Estate of Presley v. Russen, 517 F. Supp. at 1349
(adopting the test of whether a reasonable viewer would be likely to believe
the two representations to be the same) with Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (adopting the test of whether the infringing likeness
is a clear representation recognizable as the complaining party's likeness).
190. Accord, RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 729(a)(i)(1937).
191. Accord, id. at (iii).
192. Accord, id. at (ii).
193. Accord, id. at (iv).
194. Accord, id. at (b).
195. Accord, id. at (d).
196. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1601-02.
197. See, e.g., Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
For a discussion of Lerman, see notes 124-29 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Russen, see notes 144-49 and accompanying text supra.
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order of first amendment importance, are to inform, to entertain,
or to sell a product.1 8 If the primary purpose of a defendant's use
of a name or likeness is to inform, teach, or persuade on a public
issue, these courts have often conferred first amendment protection
to the defendant's use. 1 9 If the primary purpose of a defendant's
use of a name or likeness is to entertain, contribute to the arts, or
expand society's cultural experiences, the courts have also often
held that the first amendment clothes the defendant's use. 20 0 But
if the primary purpose of a defendant's use of a name or likeness
is to advance the sale of a commercial product, the courts have
generally agreed that no first amendment privilege will shield the
defendant's use. 20 ' The "primary purpose" inquiry is a helpful
examination and should be incorporated into any principled analysis to reconcile publicity and free speech rights.
C. The Nature and Extent of Harm Created by the Defendant's
Representation to the Plaintiff's Interest
The final element which should be considered in addressing
the conflict between the right of publicity and the first amendment
198. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1597. It should be noted that
these three purposes do not represent rigid divisions, but rather shifting categories; the three purposes "will often tend to merge, so that they may be
regarded as representing portions of a continuum rather than as discrete and
mutually exclusive elements." Id. For example, it has been suggested that
if the appropriation of the plaintiff's name is done in the context of a
journalistic article, there may well be mixed purposes behind the defendant's
actions including to inform, to entertain, to record a history, and to sell the
article. Interview with Prof. William D. Valente, Villanova University School
of Law, Villanova, Pa. (Jan. 19, 1982). Under such circumstances, the court's
task would be to discern the primary purpose of the defendant's actions for
purposes of the first amendment analysis.
It is suggested that a finding of a particular primary purpose, in a very
real sense, presupposes the answer in a publicity case. If the primary purpose
is to make a commercial sale, the case falls into the commercial category, and
the first amendment argument fails. If the primary purpose is to advance
information or ideas, the case falls into the newsworthiness category, and the
first amendment argument prevails. It is suggested that the finding of a
primary purpose is essentially a case-by-case fact-finding matter in which the
court must take into account all relevant evidence and testimony bearing on
the issue. As with any fact-finding matter, the trial court's initial determination of a primary purpose will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous, and therefore this decision is critical in any publicity case. For a
discussion of fact-finding in the law, see HART & SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

369-85 (1958).

199. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1597-98 & 1601-02; Sims, supra
note 8, at 486.
200. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1598 & 1604; Sims, supra
note 8, at 488.
201. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1599 & 1606; Sims, supra
note 8, at 492-93.
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is the nature and extent of harm done to the plaintiff's interest. 202
Generally, courts should sustain the plaintiff's right of publicity
claim against a first amendment attack if the nature and extent of
harm inflicted by the defendant's representation is sufficiently
grievous.

203

In adjudicating right of publicity cases, courts must carefully
isolate and identify the type of harm done to the plaintiff by the
unauthorized use of his name or likeness before balancing that
harm against opposing first amendment interests. The type of harm
inflicted upon the plaintiff can be either economic (monetary) 204 or
non-economic (emotional).2 5 Beyond assessing the type of the
plaintiff's harm, courts deciding publicity cases should also evaluate
the quantitative extent of the harm. 206 The greater the level of
the plaintiff's harm, the greater should be the likelihood that the
publicity claim prevail against first amendment assertions. 20 7 For
example, if the plaintiff has sustained a pecuniary loss of such a
magnitude so as to threaten the entire commercial value of his
name or likeness, courts should tend to uphold the publicity claim
by rationalizing that preservation of that commercial value is neces202. See generally Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14, at 1608-09. In addition
to examining the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiff's interest, courts
should also consider whether that harm was proximately caused by the defendant's representation. Harm which is not proximately caused by the
defendant's use is not a proper subject for relief. For a discussion of the
proximate cause issue, along with illustrative cases, see note 63 supra.
203. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
526 (1977). For a full discussion of Zacchini, see notes 87-98 8&165-78 and
accompanying text supra.
204. Economic injury can occur from the defendant's use by limiting the
plaintiff's ability to profit from his name or likeness. For example, in Haelan
the plaintiff successfully argued that the value of its exclusive contract right to
exploit baseball players' names and likenesses was diluted as a result of the
defendant's use. 202 F.2d at 867. For a discussion of Haelan, see notes 59-62
and accompanying text supra.
205. If the plaintiff can only show non-economic or emotional harm as a
result of the defendant's use, courts will generally only grant relief under a
privacy, and not a publicity, rubric. It is suggested that such an approach is
appropriate since the privacy tort is designed to protect against injury to
feelings, while the publicity tort is designed to protect against dilution of the
pecuniary value of names and likenesses. For a discussion of the distinction
between privacy and publicity, see notes 36-40 & 46-52 and accompanying text
supra.
206. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. at
576 (analyzing the extent of harm done to the plaintiff as a result of the
defendant's appropriation). For a full discussion of Zacchini, see notes 85-96
& 165-79 and accompanying text supra.
207. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
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sary and that it should not be categorically erased by first amend20
ment challenges.
V.

CONCLUSION

The right-of-publicity doctrine is an evolving common law
tort which seeks to preserve the pecuniary value of a plaintiff's
name and likeness in an increasingly commercialized world. 20 9 Although the publicity doctrine has been explicitly adopted by courts
and commentators for over a quarter century, -' 10 its precise substantive meaning has not been unanimously agreed upon. 211 An
emerging number of jurisdictions appear to take the position that
the doctrine possesses at least a proprietary or property-like quality.212
While issues regarding the publicity doctrine's internal
content remain important state law questions, 213 the constitutional
contours of the doctrine cut across state lines, and present weighty
conceptual problems.

2 14

The inherent conflict between the right of publicity and the
first amendment causes two important societal policies to collidethe policy of encouraging private enterprise and creativity by protecting the proprietary value of an individual's name and likeness, 215
and the policy of advancing the uninhibited expression of political,
social, and artistic views by protecting free speech. 21 6 Courts, as
well as commentators, have sought to structure the appropriate
accommodation between these two competing policies, without unduly burdening either one.2 17 But the disjointed decisions of many
courts suggest that publicity law is still lacking in a coherent and
208. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.

at 574-75.
209. For a review of the right of publicity doctrine, see notes 1-3 and

accompanying text supra.
210. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1953); Nimmer, supra note 2 (1954 commentary).

211. For cases which disagree on the substantive meaning of the publicity
doctrine, see note 8 supra.
212. See notes 54-86 and accompanying text supra.
213. For a survey of the important content issues regarding the publicity
doctrine, see note 8 supra.
214. For a discussion of the first amendment problem in publicity law,
see notes 99-178 and accompanynig text supra.
215. For the Supreme Court's articulation of this policy, see notes 94-97
and accompanying text supra.
216. For Judge Learned Hand's articulation of this policy, see note 9
supra.

217. See, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981);
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 14.
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unified analytic theory which incorporates first amendment considerations. 218 As courts progress in developing such a unified
theory, care must be taken to avoid being so structurally rigid as
to lock out the desire of individual judges to do justice in the
particular suit before them.
For this reason, a case-by-case approach has been suggested
under which courts can seek to resolve the struggle between the
right of publicity and the first amendment by examining only
three factors-the similarity between the defendant's representation
and the plaintiff's right of publicity, the primary purpose behind
the defendant's representation, and the nature and extent of harm
done to the plaintiff's interest.2 1 9 It is hoped that by employing
such an analysis, the opposing policies of publicity and free speech
can be reconciled in a rational and consistent way, while permitting
sufficient flexibility to meet the need to do justice in individual
cases.
Ganesh Bala
218. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. For a review of the tension in cases accommodating publicity and free speech interests, see notes
105-64 and accompanying text supra.

219. For a proposed analysis to be used in future cases where the right
of publicity conflicts with the first amendment, see notes 187-208 and accompanying text supra.
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